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The Liberty of Non-citizens: Indefinite 
Detention in Commonwealth Countries, 
by Rayner Thwaites1
COLIN GREY2
MOST MIGRANTS ARE NOT FUGITIVES. Nor are they dangerous or deranged. Yet 
in the past two decades they have been likelier to end up in detention, lasting a 
few days to many years.3 Rayner Thwaites’s The Liberty of Non-Citizens is a work 
of comparative legal scholarship that should be read by anyone interested in the 
laws and jurisprudence that have enabled this trend.
Thwaites’s book traces the history and impact of three crucially important 
decisions on immigration detention: the 2004 Al-Kateb decision by the High 
Court of Australia, the 2004 Belmarsh decision from the House of Lords, and 
1. (Oxford: Hart, 2014). In the interest of transparency, I disclose that Professor Thwaites 
invited me to review his book.
2. Professeur régulier, Département des sciences juridiques, Université du Québec à Montréal. 
Many thanks go to Rayner Thwaites and Richard Haigh for comments. Errors and 
infelicities are my own.
3. The growing use of immigration detention is now much studied. For a recent survey of 
the phenomenon, see Amy Nethery & Stephanie J Silverman, Immigration Detention: 
The Migration of a Policy and Its Human Impact (Abingdon, UK: Routledge, 2015); for a 
disturbing report about the practice of immigration detention in Canada, see Hanna Gros 
& Paloma van Groll, “We Have No Rights”: Arbitrary Imprisonment and Cruel Treatment 
of Migrants with Mental Health Issues in Canada (Toronto: International Human Rights 
Program, University of Toronto Faculty of Law, 2015).
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the 2007 Charkaoui decision by the Supreme Court of Canada.4 The three cases 
led to strikingly different conclusions on the legality of detention, and Thwaites’s 
animating question asks how we might explain this disparity, given the respective 
countries’ common legal heritage and the proximity in time of the decisions. 
He answers by suggesting that the judges who wrote them hold “fundamentally 
different understandings of the rights of non-citizens.”5 Some judges are 
“rights-protecting” and conceive that migrants have an equal right to liberty 
(equal, that is, to citizens) notwithstanding their immigration status. As a result, 
they find detention impermissible unless removal is reasonably foreseeable. Other 
judges are “rights-precluding” and affirm the power to detain without inquiring 
into the actual foreseeability of removal.6 On Thwaites’s accounting, Belmarsh 
lands on the rights-protecting side of the ledger, Al-Kateb and Charkaoui on the 
rights-precluding side.
Unfortunately, Thwaites scatters his discussion of the rights-protecting 
and rights-precluding models throughout the book, making it hard to 
assess the models’ interpretive power and the normative justification for the 
rights-protecting model.7 In what follows, I will try to clarify Thwaites’s models 
as a means of understanding his classification of the Canadian case Charkaoui as 
rights-precluding. The focus is on Charkaoui because it is by far the most difficult 
of the three cases to place. In its decision, the Court struck down aspects of the 
existing regime for the detention of non-citizens certified as security threats and 
expressly disavowed prolonged and indefinite detention. However, the Court also 
left in place a case-by-case approach to detention review that in practice has 
allowed prolonged detention to continue. As will be seen, I believe it is hard 
to say definitively that Charkaoui is rights-precluding; this difficulty is partly a 
product of the decision and partly a product of Thwaites’s typology.
I. BELMARSH, AL-KATEB, AND CHARKAOUI
The starting point in understanding Thwaites’s two models is to recognize that 
the “right” either precluded or protected in the three decisions studied is “the 
4. Al-Kateb v Godwin, [2004] HCA 37, 219 CLR 562 [Al-Kateb]; A v Secretary of State for the 
Home Department, [2004] UKHL 56, [2005] 2 AC 68 [Belmarsh]; Charkaoui v Canada 
(Citizenship and Immigration), 2007 SCC 9, [2007] 1 SCR 350 [Charkaoui]. Thwaites also 
discusses the subsequent Charkaoui case, which does not address detention. See Charkaoui v 
Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2008 SCC 38, [2008] 2 SCR 326.
5. Thwaites, supra note 1 at 307.
6. Ibid at 15-16.
7. For the most extended discussion, see ibid at 15-20.
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right to liberty”8 (in this context, the potentially protean right to liberty equates 
to a Hohfeldian “immunity from detention”). At times Thwaites also writes as 
though the right at stake should be deemed the “equal right to liberty,” since the 
yardstick for whether non-citizens’ rights have been protected or precluded is said 
to be the treatment of citizens. Thus the Belmarsh decision, in which the House 
of Lords held invalid a government order permitting the indefinite detention of 
non-nationals certified to be security risks,9 is rights-protecting because it accords 
to non-citizens immunity from detention on par with the immunity accorded to 
citizens. Al-Kateb10 is rights-precluding because it does not. In it, a majority of 
the High Court of Australia found that the Australian Migration Act11 authorizes 
the indefinite detention of migrants (because one could never deem removal 
impossible) and, further, upheld the Act’s constitutionality. Whereas the Belmarsh 
decision has been “hailed as a historic beacon in the judicial defence of liberty,”12 
Al-Kateb is seen as a restrictionist high-water mark, on par with the United 
States Supreme Court’s Cold War-era decision in Mezei, a case that authorized 
indefinite “harborage” on Ellis Island in even starker terms.13
Less clear-cut than either of these is Charkaoui, in which the appellants were 
detained under a regime for the certification of non-citizen security threats14 
contained in Canada’s Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA).15 Under 
aspects of this regime that continue today, the Minister of Immigration, Refugees, 
and Citizenship (formerly the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) and the 
Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness may jointly certify that 
8. Ibid at 15.
9. Supra note 4. The order in issue purported to derogate from the European Convention 
on Human Rights. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms, 4 November 1950, 213 UNTS 221, Eur TS 5 (entered into force 3 September 
1953) [ECHR]. Article 5(1)(f ) of the ECHR provides:
1. Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be deprived of his 
liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law:
...
f. the lawful arrest or detention of … a person against whom action is being taken with a 
view to deportation … (ibid).
10. Supra note 4.
11. Ibid. See Migration Act 1958 (Cth), s 196.
12. Thwaites, supra note 1 at 124.
13. Shaughnessy v United States ex rel Mezei, 345 US 206 (1953) (“Whatever our individual 
estimate of [the] policy and the fears on which it rests, respondent’s right to enter the United 
States depends on the congressional will, and courts cannot substitute their judgment for the 
legislative mandate” at 216).
14. Supra note 4.
15. SC 2001, c 27 [IRPA].
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a foreign national or permanent resident is inadmissible to Canada on various 
security- or criminality-related grounds. If this assessment is found reasonable by 
a judge of the Federal Court, the certificate constitutes an order for removal from 
Canada.16 Further, certified persons may be detained pending the Federal Court’s 
decision and then, if the certificate is found reasonable, pending removal.17 In 
Charkaoui, the Court concluded that the lack of timely detention reviews for 
certified foreign nationals (as opposed to permanent residents, who had access to 
timely review) unjustifiably violated sections 9 and 10(c) of the Charter,18 which 
respectively provide a guarantee against arbitrary detention and a right to habeas 
corpus.19 In response to this ruling, the government amended the IRPA so that 
initial detention reviews are now held within forty-eight hours for all certified 
persons,20 in line with most immigration detention reviews outside the security 
certificate context.21
Because it resulted in a win for the non-citizen appellants, the Court’s decision 
at first seems like it might be placed alongside Belmarsh as a rights-protecting 
decision. After all, the decision did protect rights.22 Yet Thwaites classes Charkaoui 
alongside Al-Kateb as rights-precluding, largely because of the Court’s response to 
another constitutional argument. In addition to the challenge based on the lack 
of timely review, one of the appellants challenged the detention regime because it 
allowed for prolonged or indefinite detention. The Court rejected this challenge, 
saying that the constitutional concern about lengthy detention was met by the 
16. Ibid, ss 77-80.
17. Ibid, ss 81-82.4.
18. Charkaoui, supra note 4 at paras 93-94.
19. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, s 9, 10(c), Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, 
being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11.
20. IRPA, supra note 15, s 82(1).
21. See ibid, s 57 (governing detention reviews outside the security certificate regime). The 
accompanying text refers to “most” (as opposed to all) detention reviews because certain 
foreign nationals—whose arrival is designated as “irregular” by the Minister of Public Safety 
and Emergency Preparedness—do not have access to a first detention review for fourteen 
days. See ibid, ss 20.1(1)(a), 57.1.
22. Further tending in a rights-protecting direction, but less directly relevant to the discussion 
here, the Court also found that the then-existing procedures for reviewing the reasonableness 
of a security certificate unjustifiably violated s 7 of the Charter. Charkaoui, supra note 4 at 
paras 65, 87 (the ground for invalidating the reasonableness review of security certificates 
was that too much evidence was withheld from both the certified person and the reviewing 
judge). In response to the Court’s decision, Parliament enacted a system under which secret 
information can be challenged on behalf of a certified person by a special advocate. Certified 
persons themselves, however, receive only a summary of the government’s secret information. 
See the IRPA, ibid ss 83, 85-85.6.
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Act’s scheme of regular detention reviews.23 Thwaites’s main complaint against 
Charkaoui is that the Court failed either to establish a presumptive time limit on 
detention or even to say that, in all cases, at a certain point in time, prolonged 
detention will pass into unlawfulness. Instead, the Court “put its faith in a 
case-by-case review of each detainee’s individual circumstances”24 in accordance 
with factors established earlier by the Federal Court-Trial Division in a case 
called Sahin25 and later codified in section 248 of the Immigration and Refugee 
Protection Regulations.26
Thwaites argues that this reliance on the case-by-case application of regulatory 
factors means that indefinite detention is allowed in practice. Here Thwaites is 
indisputably correct: It is simply a non sequitur to claim that regular detention 
reviews prevent indefinite detention; at best, all they allow for is the regular 
possibility of release but no guarantee such release will happen. Subsequent cases 
of lengthy detention have borne out this concern.27
Still, the Supreme Court did not seem to see its decision in rights-precluding 
terms. To begin with, the Court stated clearly that the IRPA “does not 
authorize indefinite detention and … provides an effective review process that 
meets the requirements of Canadian law.”28 The Court also said that “length 
23. Charkaoui, supra note 4 at paras 107-110.
24. Thwaites, supra note 1 at 259.
25. Sahin v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [1995] 1 FC 214 at paras 30-32, 
[1994] FCJ No 1534 [Sahin].
26. SOR/2002-227, s 248. For the approval of the factors set out in Sahin and the factors in 
section 248, see Charkaoui, supra note 4 at paras 108-117.
27. In one of the worst cases, a man apparently named Michael Mvogo was detained for over 
eight years because of difficulties establishing his identity. For discussion, see Gros and 
van Groll, supra note 3 at 91. The case of Mr. Mvogo and three other cases of prolonged 
detention are discussed in Chaudhary v Canada. Chaudhary v Canada (Public Safety and 
Emergency Preparedness), 2015 ONCA 700, 127 OR (3d) 401. For a particularly vertiginous 
example of seemingly indefinite detention, see Warssama v Canada (Minister of Citizenship 
and Immigration), 2015 FC 1311, [2015] FCJ No 1356 [Warssama]. Warssama involves 
a Somali national subject to removal due to his criminal record. In practice, however, Mr. 
Warssama could not be removed because he would not sign a form agreeing to “cooperate” 
(ibid at para 10). This form is necessary because removal to Somalia involves turning the 
foreign national, unescorted, to an African airline for a flight from Nairobi to Mogadishu; 
Canadian pilots and authorities do not travel to Somalia because it is considered unsafe (ibid 
at paras 11-12). At the time of the decision, on 24 November 2015, Mr. Warssama had spent 
fifty-seven months in detention because “[t]he authorities ha[d] every reason to believe that 
if Mr. Warssama were to be released into the population at large he would not voluntarily 
appear for his removal”: not, notably, because he was considered a danger to the public or a 
security risk (ibid at paras 2, 34).
28. Charkaoui, supra note 4 at para 127.
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of the detention to date is an important factor” and that “[i]f there will be a 
lengthy detention before deportation or if the future detention time cannot be 
ascertained, this is a factor that weighs in favour of release.”29 And it added that 
its pronouncements were consistent with holdings in Belmarsh,30 as well as in two 
other cases that Thwaites deems rights-protecting, Zadvydas and Hardial Singh.31 
These two cases pronounced indefinite detention unlawful insofar as “detention 
in this context can be used only during the period where it is reasonably necessary 
for deportation purposes.”32 Notably Zadvydas, from the US Court, imposed a 
presumptive time limit of six months33 on detention, and Hardial Singh, a key 
British precedent from the Queen’s Bench Division, held that detention was 
limited to a period “reasonably necessary” for the purpose of removal.34 Barring 
disingenuousness on the Supreme Court’s part, its declaration of consistency in 
principle with these foreign authorities seems to indicate that it considered that 
it held a compatible conception of non-citizens’ liberty rights. In the face of these 
aspects of the decision, whether we should accept the classification of Charkaoui 
as rights-precluding depends on getting a better grasp of just what it means for a 
decision to be either rights-protecting or rights-precluding.
II. PRECLUDING AND PROTECTING RIGHTS
This task is complicated because, as Thwaites recognizes, there really are two 
variants, not one, of the rights-precluding model. The task is made harder by the 
fact that the second rights-precluding model and the rights-protecting model are 
in fact quite similar in conception.
A first, uncompromising version of rights-preclusion denies that non-citizens 
have any liberty right independent of the permission of the political branches of a 
receiving state to be in that state’s territory. Absent such permission, a non-citizen 
has no right to be at liberty in the state’s territory and no court can order his or 
29. Ibid at para 115.
30. Ibid at para 127.
31. Ibid at para 124.
32. Ibid.
33. Zadvydas v Davis, 533 US 678 at 701 (2001), 121 S Ct 2491 (per Breyer J) [Zadvydas]; see 
Thwaites, supra note 1 at 4-7.
34. R v Governor of Durham Prison, ex parte Singh, [1984] 1 All ER 983 at 985, [1983] EWHC 1 
(QB); see Thwaites, supra note 1 at 126-28.
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her release.35 Thwaites attributes such reasoning to the majority opinion of Justice 
Hayne of the High Court of Australia in Al-Kateb, who wrote in his opinion 
that there was no “judgment made against a person otherwise entitled to be 
at liberty in the Australian community. The premise for the debate is that the 
non-citizen does not have permission to be at liberty in the community.”36 In a 
concurring opinion, Justice McHugh further opined that release of non-removal 
migrants into the community would lead to “de facto Australian citizen[ship].”37 
This version of the rights-precluding model thus seems shaped by a concern that 
release would equate to admission, even admission to citizenship, which have 
been ruled out by statute and executive decision. Crudely, detention is justified 
because admission is disallowed. Or, as Justice McHugh apparently asked in oral 
argument: “How can you claim a right of release into the country when you have 
no legal right to be here?”38
Thwaites says the difficulty with this line of reasoning lies in a problematic 
slide from “exclusion at the border and removal from Australian territory, 
to exclusion and removal from the Australian community.”39 What the courts 
have overlooked is the “alien’s continuing vulnerability to deportation,”40 which 
eliminates concerns about de facto citizenship. I think, however, it is a mistake to 
dismiss this view as based on a problematic elision. If removal really is impossible, 
it surely follows that a migrant who would have been indefinitely detained would, 
35. Thwaites characterizes this as allowing immigration detention for the purpose of “segregation 
from the community,” which he deems “a new type of non-punitive detention.” Thwaites, 
supra note 1 at 74-75.
36. Al-Kateb, supra note 4 at para 254, cited in Thwaites, supra note 1 at 74. As Thwaites notes 
(ibid), Hayne J’s reasoning is “reminiscent” of the dissenting opinion of Scalia J in Zadvydas. 
See Zadvydas, supra note 33 at 702-703. Scalia J writes:
A criminal alien under final order of removal who allegedly will not be accepted by any other 
country in the reasonably foreseeable future claims a constitutional right of supervised release 
into the United States. This claim can be repackaged as freedom from “physical restraint” or 
freedom from “indefinite detention,” … but it is at bottom a claimed right of release into 
this country by an individual who concededly has no legal right to be here. There is no such 
constitutional right [emphasis in original].
 For Thwaites’s discussion of Zadvydas, see ibid at 4-10.
37. Al-Kateb, supra note 4 at para 46. Another clear statement comes in the way Thwaites 
contrasts the majority decision with the unanimously decided Offshore Processing Case. See 
Thwaites, supra note 1 at 106-108, citing Plaintiff M61/2010E v Commonwealth, [2010] 
HCA 41, (2011) 243 CLR 319.
38. Thwaites, supra note 1 at 114.
39. Ibid at 75.
40. Ibid at 76.
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upon release, indefinitely reside. What is more, the natural result of indefinite 
residence—as social ties are formed and a life is slowly built—is that, at a certain 
point, citizenship, or some proxy thereof, would become required as a matter 
of substantive justice. At that point removal, once possible, might no longer be 
morally or legally acceptable. Thus, citizenship, or at least a stronger case against 
eventual removal and various rights and obligations attaching to long-term 
residence, may well follow in cases such as these.
Regardless of how one analyses this first rights-precluding model, it seems 
clear that it does not capture the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Charkaoui. 
In Charkaoui, the Court clearly contemplated the possibility of release at 
some point, notwithstanding the decision by the executive branch that the 
non-citizen appellants were not permitted to be in Canada. So if Charkaoui is 
rights-precluding, it must be so under a second version. This version accepts that 
migrants may have an interest in release despite their lack of permission from 
the political branches to be in the territory of the detaining country. Presumably, 
this interest is both an interest in avoiding the suffering that attends detention 
as well as a more affirmative interest in living freely and all that that involves, 
such as being together with one’s family, building a career, developing a broader 
network of social ties, and participating in political life. However, on this version, 
such interests are assessed somehow differently in the case of migrants than are 
the corresponding interests of citizens. We might say, metaphorically, that they 
are given less weight. Or we might say that countervailing considerations have 
decisive importance that they would not have in the case of citizens. Thus John 
Finnis, whom Thwaites treats as a scholarly exemplar of rights-preclusion, writes 
that “the presence in the community of an alien who, individually considered, 
can fairly be said to present some genuine risk, even relatively slight, ... need 
not be accepted.”41 The key difference is that, before contemplating preventative 
detention of citizens, we would demand more than a “relatively slight” risk.42 
41. John Finnis, “Nationality, Alienage and Constitutional Principle” (2007) 123 LQR 417 
at 423 [emphasis in original]. For discussion of this passage, see Thwaites, supra note 1 at 
21-22. See also Zadvydas, supra note 33 at 717. Kennedy J, the author of the other dissenting 
opinion in Zadvydas, writes: “The reason detention is permitted ... is that a removable alien 
does not have the same liberty interest as a citizen does.”
42. This is in contrast to the use of indefinite detention in the criminal context which, 
in Canada, requires a prior conviction for a personal injury offence. See R v Lyons, [1987] 
2 SCR 309, 44 DLR (4th) 193. See also Charkaoui, supra note 4 at para 107: The Court 
states that “[t]he principles underlying Lyons must be adapted in the case at bar to the 
immigration context, which requires a period of time for review of the named person’s right 
to remain in Canada.”
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Finnis’s discussion understandably focused specifically on risk, since he was 
attacking the result in Belmarsh. However, in general, this second rights-precluding 
model discounts the liberty interest of non-citizens regardless of the reason for 
removal, so long as the government is making “good faith” efforts at removal.43 
Nonetheless, however high it sets the bar, this second rights-precluding model at 
least contemplates release, unlike the first. In so doing, it seems to have more in 
common with Thwaites’s conception of the rights-protecting model, which (as I 
explain immediately below) also engages in a balancing of interests, than it does 
with the first rights-precluding model, which does not.
Under the rights-protecting model, according to Thwaites, “[d]etention is 
lawful if it is proportionate to the infringement of the detainee’s liberty interest, 
as judged against the purpose of facilitating the non-citizen’s removal.”44 What 
this amounts to, he argues, is that detention will not be proportionate when not 
“reasonably necessary” to achieve removal.45 Note further that, in its proportionality 
analysis, the rights-protecting model satisfies itself with the necessity of facilitating 
removal, whatever the basis for the initial reason to detain.46 This is important 
because the initial reason for detention will often reflect the reasons for removal, 
as well as more general concerns about immigration control (leading to detention 
of those non-citizens who cannot be identified or who are considered flight risks). 
Thus the rights-protecting approach accepts that any given reason for removal 
can justify detention for some period of time, as can immigration control in 
general. By accepting as much, the rights-protecting approach arguably discounts 
the liberty interest of non-citizens significantly. If a non-citizen were detained 
even for a few days in order to be removed, say, because that non-citizen worked 
in contravention of the terms of a student visa, it would be hard to see how that 
43. Thwaites, supra note 1 at 16. This seems to be in contrast with the first rights-precluding 
model, which requires only that the government have the “purpose” of removal. See 
ibid at 68, 75.
44. Ibid at 11. Or, in another statement:
Under a rights-protecting approach, a commitment to the non-citizen’s liberty right is evident 
at two points in the legal reasoning. It serves to define the permissible purposes of detention, 
and it informs a proportionality analysis of detention for that purpose. The two elements go 
together because a permissible immigration purpose will always be amenable to proportionality 
analysis (ibid at 299).
45. Ibid at 13.
46. Ibid at 14, n 68. This is consistent with the approach of the European Court of Human 
Rights in Chahal. See Chahal v United Kingdom, [1996] ECHR 54, 23 EHRR 413.
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liberty right might in any way be construed as on par with that of citizens.47 There 
is simply no analogue case in which a citizen might be detained for performing 
work that is not criminal in nature.
So there are important similarities between the rights-protecting model 
and the second rights-precluding model. Both are underwritten by a kind of 
proportionality analysis. Moreover, in both cases, this proportionality analysis 
does not look at the reason for removal and, by demurring on this point, concedes 
a great deal to the imperative of immigration control. The major difference 
between them, it seems, is that a rights-protecting judge (or a rights-protecting 
legal scholar) will always claim that the proportionality analysis favours release 
after a shorter period of time. What this suggests is that what is in play here is not 
so much a “fundamentally different understanding of the rights of non-citizens”48 
as a difference of judgment.49
All this makes it hard to classify Charkaoui according to the models Thwaites 
has established. The classification is yet more challenging because of a further 
aspect of the rights-protection model. As I have said, Thwaites’s main difficulty 
with the Court’s decision is that it failed to establish a presumptive time limit on 
indefinite detention. But if it is a non sequitur for the Court to claim that regular 
detention reviews prevent indefinite detention, it is an equal but opposite non 
sequitur to say that a proportionality analysis will invariably lead to release after 
a certain amount of time. A proportionality analysis simply weighs competing 
values to arrive at an all-things-considered judgment. In the present context, the 
key values in opposition are, on the one hand, the imperative of immigration 
control and, on the other, the non-citizen’s interest in being free from detention. 
Unless one is willing to call into question the imperative of immigration 
control—as neither the rights-protection model nor the Court in Charkaoui 
seems to be—then it seems implausible to claim that a proportionality analysis 
will always lead to the requirement that removal must be reasonably foreseeable 
47. Here it might be pointed out that a citizen of country A could be detained on such grounds 
in country B, and vice versa, so that a kind of equality is at work. However, this observation 
does not address the question as to why, within each country, detention of non-citizens is 
considered justified for the purpose of removal. Why, that is, we consider that non-citizen 
status justifies this symmetrical inequality.
48. Thwaites, supra note 1 at 307. See also supra note 5 and accompanying text.
49. That what is at stake is a difference in the judgment of what proportionality requires may 
explain how the Court in Charkaoui, in Thwaites’s words, “arrived at a criterion for limiting 
detention that proved capable of accommodating not only the positions adopted in Hardial 
Singh and Zadvydas, but their opposite, the competing position against which the ratio of 
these decisions was defined.” Thwaites, supra note 1 at 265.
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for detention to be justified. The plausibility of such a claim increases, though I 
will not say it is categorically established, once one brings the reasons for removal 
into the mix, to be weighed against the adverse psychological and other impacts 
of detention.50 And to bring the reasons for removal into the mix, one must 
be willing to question the imperative of immigration control at the pleasure of 
the political branches. All talk of “reasonableness” or “proportionality” that does 
not address the justifiability of immigration control only modestly advances the 
protection of non-citizens’ rights.
Though I have argued that the rights-precluding and rights-protecting models 
are not entirely convincing as interpretive tools, and that the rights-protecting 
model is not normatively satisfying on its own terms as a claim to vindicate 
non-citizens’ right to liberty, Thwaites has made a worthy contribution to the 
growing scholarship on immigration detention by examining Belmarsh, Al-Kateb, 
and Charkaoui together. He has advanced our understanding considerably, and 
readers will gain much from engaging with his book, as I have.
50. Thwaites discusses these impacts but not in the context of setting out the proportionality 
analysis under the rights-protection model. See Thwaites, supra note 1 at 102-103. Thwaites 
also discusses the psychological impact of “control orders”—essentially a form of conditional 
release—in the United Kingdom. Ibid at 193, 196-98. For a discussion of the psychological 
consequences of detention in the Canadian context, see Janet Cleveland and Cécile 
Rousseau, “Psychiatric Symptoms Associated With Brief Detention of Adult Asylum Seekers 
in Canada” (2013) 58 Can J Psychiatry 409. For other factors that might be considered in a 
proportionality analysis considering immigration detention, see Michael Flynn, “Who must 
be Detained? Proportionality as a Tool for Critiquing Immigration Detention Policy” (2012) 
31 Refugee Survey Quarterly 40 at 55-67.
